

Resolutions concerning the Japanese-American Negotiations  
adopted through the conferences in the Imperial presence.

1. Through the Imperial conference on July 2, 1941.
2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941.
3. Through the Imperial conference on November 5, 1941.

Proposition (A)  
Proposition (B)

4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1, 1941.

(Tavener's Excerpt)

1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on  
July 2, 1941.

A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes  
in the situation.

#### I PRINCIPLE.

- a. Regardless of any change in the international situation,  
Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater  
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to  
the establishment of world-peace.
- b. Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident,  
and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for  
herself a basis for self-existence and self-defence. The Nor-  
thern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in  
the situations.
- c. Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the  
foregoing purpose.

#### II SUMMARY.

- a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, fur-  
ther pressure will be strengthened to the changes in the situa-  
tions, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chungking  
Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy con-  
cessions in China.
- b. For the sake of her self-existence and self-defence Japan  
will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant  
nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other  
necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations  
for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall  
accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-  
China and Thailand following the "Principle Policy toward French  
Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion

of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will be ready for a war with Britain and the United States.

c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States.

e We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently.

f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense.

g As to the definite measures we shall decide separately.  
(End Tavenner's excerpt)

2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept. 6, 1941.

Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy.

In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the "Principle of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations," as follows:

a In order to secure self-existence and self-defence, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October.

b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.

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c If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October, we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands.)

All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection.

Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain).

(1) Matters concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT.

The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident.

a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchoukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration.

b "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support.

REMARK -- The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity.

Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident.

It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly.



(2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defence.

The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defence.

a Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement.

b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory.

c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East.

(3) Matters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary materials.

The United States and Britain will cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources.

a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South-Western Pacific, with resources indispensable for her self-existence.

b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China.

Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I:

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War.

b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.

SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATION WITH BRITAIN CONCERNING THAILAND.  
(Memorandum)

Adopted in the Liaison Conference between the  
Imperial Headquarters and the Ministry, on August 16, 1941

Referring to the British Ambassador's private plans, chiefly on the problems of Thailand, at the conference with our Foreign Minister on August 11th, Japan's policy will be altered as follows:

(1) Japan's demands to Britain.

a Britain will respect the neutrality of Thailand and will not execute military measures there.

b Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with all resources necessary for her self-existence from Burma, Malay, British-Borneo, India, Australia, New Zealand, and other areas in the South-Western Pacific under British influence; and will devise the most favourable measures to normalize commercial tradings with those respective areas.

c From the Dutch East Indies and Thailand, Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with resources necessary for her self-existence; and in normalizing Japan's commercial trades with these nations, Britain will not take any obstructive measures and abandon her present actions that are proving a menace.

d Britain will bar her aid to Chiang Kai-shek (including the closure of the Burma Route).

(2) Matters that may be agreed upon according to the attitude of the British.

a We shall respect the neutrality of Thailand.

b We shall not make any military proposals to, nor military advances into Thailand.

c We shall not make any military advance not only in Thailand but also in all areas adjacent to French Indo-China (excluding China).

(3) Our principles in the negotiations.

a This negotiation will be the continuation of the daily contacts between our Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador; and each matter will be discussed in turn in the form of a reply to the Ambassador's private proposals. At the beginning, the problems of discussions will be localized to the utmost, and we shall strive to minimize the sphere of British proposals. We acknowledge it to be the best policy to start the discussions on the following matters:

- (a) Respect of Thailand's neutrality.
- (b) Military advance will not be made into Thailand.
- (c) Burma Route will be closed.
- (d) Resources will be supplied to Japan smoothly.

b Such problems as: Abandoning of Britain's aid to Chiang Kai-shek, Japan's not making military advances into Thailand and all other areas adjacent to French Indo-China, and problems of Dutch East-Indies, will be discussed after looking over the situation of the negotiations.

c In the course of this negotiation, attention must be paid lest we shall have nothing to profit, our future freedom of action will be restricted, and our present privileged standing will be obstructed.

(REMARK) The Imperial Government will promptly settle by mutual concessions the conference being held with Thailand in winding up the affairs of the frozen assets, and according to the situation, she will continue to negotiate on the general economic cooperation.

In this negotiation, special importance will be stressed on Japan's obtaining of her necessary resources.

### 3. PROPOSITIONS (A) and (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

#### PROPOSITION (A)

##### (1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination.

In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China."

(2) Problems of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. We shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time, we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has already had the acknowledgement of the United States.

##### (3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops.

This problem will be eased as follows:

##### a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China.

Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island will be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with the establishment of peace



to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two years.

(Note) If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years.

b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China.

Japanese government will respect French Indo-China's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States, (both understandings and other statements.)

PROPOSITION (B)

(1) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo-China.

(2) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies.

(3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets.

The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum.

(4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China.

(REMARKS)

(1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area.

(2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A, may be additionally inserted.

4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941. Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5, have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.